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THE OFF-RESERVATION GARNISHMENT OF AN ON-
RESERVATION DEBT AND RELATED ISSUES IN THE
CROSS-BOUNDARY ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY
JUDGMENTS*
Robert Laurence**
The Problem Stated
Imagine a hypothetical member of a hypothetical Indian tribe, say,
Roberta Avila of the Tewa Tribe, whose reservation lies in the not-so-
hypothetical state of New Mexico. Ms. Avila works mostly on-reservation
- with occasional trips to off-reservation training sessions - as a computer
operator for Global Mining, Inc., a non-Indian-owned business incorporated
in Delaware, with corporate headquarters in Denver and operations in sixteen
states and three foreign countries. Global Mining does not do any off-
reservation business in New Mexico, aside from the minor purchase of office
supplies and such.
Ms. Avila banks at First Federal Savings Bank, located just off the
reservation and, as Avila does not use "direct deposit" of her paycheck, this
means she must drive to Mesa City, bordering the reservation, to do her
banking business. First Federal's only on-reservation facility is an ATM
machine, which it operates inside of the Tewa Casino, and which is used
mainly by nonmember players. This machine is capable of taking deposits,
but Avila has never used it for that purpose, nor has most anyone else.
Ms. Avila also follows family tradition and makes pottery, which she sells
in two ways. Some pots she places on consignment with Garcia's Pawn
Shop, an off-reservation business. The arrangement between Avila and
Garcia's is both longstanding and rather informal: she delivers her pots to
Garcia's shop in Mesa City, and receives a receipt. Every few months she
places some new pots in the shop, picks up the money for the pots that have
sold, and reclaims the ones that remain. All deliveries and exchanges are
made off-reservation. Secondly, Avila sells her pots through the local Tewa
*This article is a revised and expanded version of one small piece of a much longer article.
See P.S. Deloria & Robert Laurence, Negotiating Tribal-State Full Faith and Credit Agreements:
The Topology of the Negotiation and the Merits of the Question, 28 GA. L. REV. 365 (1994). Due
credit is given and acknowledged to Sam Deloria, whose contributions to that article and this one
were immeasurable. Thanks, too, to Jessica R. Martin for her valuable, comprehensive, and good-
natured research assistance.
**Robert A. Leflar Professor of Law, University of Arkansas. Professor Laurence has a string
of degrees from a number of second-rate North American institutions.
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Potters' Cooperative, which runs a store for tourists on-reservation. The
Cooperative is not incorporated under New Mexico law, and it engages in
no off-reservation business.
Suppose now that Avila entered into a contract to buy a new car from
Mesa City Dodge, giving a purchase money security interest in return. The
contract was negotiated and signed at Mesa City Dodge's off-reservation
location, and the car was delivered there. Avila later defaulted on the
contract and surrendered the car back to the seller. Pursuant to New Mexico
law,' Mesa City Dodge resold the car at a private sale and then sued Avila
in state court for the difference between what was owed and the resale price
of the car, plus expenses.2 Avila did not answer and Mesa City Dodge
recovered a default deficiency judgment of $5000. Avila has not paid this
judgment voluntarily, and the creditor now seeks to enforce the judgment
under New Mexico law. However, with the exception of the pots she has
placed at Garcia's Pawn Shop, all of Avila's tangible property is located on
the reservation, unreachable by state process. Suppose finally that Mesa City
Dodge is reluctant, though not absolutely adverse, to use tribal process, for
the Tewa tribal courts are notoriously disinclined to enforce off-reservation
default deficiency judgments relating to new car and truck sales.
The enforcement option that would probably occur to most off-reservation
lawyers advising Mesa City Dodge in this scenario is garnishment. There are
three non-Indian entities here - Global Mining, Inc., First Federal Savings
Bank, and Garcia's Pawn Shop - each of which is comfortably located off-
reservation, each of which is entirely reachable by state process, and each of
which owes Avila money. The question then, and the one which this article
addresses, is whether garnishment under state law is an appropriate
enforcement technique in the problem given.
The Basic Rules of Garnishment
Garnishment is one of the most convenient and effective judicial
collection devices available to a plaintiff when a money judgment is not paid
voluntarily? The garnishment may issue upon anyone owing money to or
1. UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504 (1977).
2. The Uniform Commercial Code mentions the creditores right to obtain a deficiency
judgment in section 9-504(2), but it does not mention any connection between this entitlement
and the creditor's having complied with the UCC's repossession and resale requirements. Some
states would deny Mesa City Dodge a deficiency judgment if it had not properly followed article
9's rules. See, e.g., Bank of Beatden v. Simpson, 808 S.W.2d 341, 342 (Ark. 1991). Most other
states would at least give Avila a presumption that no deficiency would have existed following
a sale in compliance with the Code. See, e.g., CIT Corp. v. Nielson Logging Co, 706 P.2d 967,
969 (Or. App. 1985).
3. Regarding garnishment in general, see JAMES J. BROWN, JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT
PRACTICE AND LITIGATION (1994); ROGER A. NEEDHAM & LESTER POLLACK, COLLECTING
CLAIMS AND ENFORCING JUDGMENTS (1968); EuZABErH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE
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having possession of the defendant's property. The writ of garnishment is
served on the garnishee, with notice going to the defendant, and the
garnishee answers, usually admitting the debt owed. The debt is paid into
court and transferred to the plaintiff. Participation in the garnishment
satisfies the garnishee's underlying indebtedness to the defendant, but is
usually not res judicata between the defendant and the garnishee on the
question of the validity of the debt.4
While it is true that one may garnish debts before maturity, the derivative
title principle applies and the plaintiff as garnishor succeeds only to the
defendant's rights! Hence, when an immature obligation is garnished, the
plaintiff cannot advance the due date. On the other hand, one may not
garnish a contingent liability unless statutory authority exists.' The plaintiff
may not garnish negotiable paper, more precisely, payment by the garnishee
pursuant to the garnishment does not relieve the garnishee from liability to
a holder in due course of the paper. Furthermore, some courts hold that
judgment debtors are not subject to garnishment by their plaintiffs
creditors.'
The garnishment is a new lawsuit between the original plaintiff, now the
garnishor, and the defendant's debtor, now the garnishee. The garnishment
is ancillary to the initial suit between the plaintiff and the defendant, and the
defendant is the real party in interest. By service of the writ of garnishment,
the garnishee is made to answer what debts he or she may owe to the
defendant or what property of the defendant he or she may possess. While
there are often penalties for a defaulting garnishee, in the usual course of
things, the garnishee is a disinterested party, willing, but for the
inconvenience and expense, to participate in the garnishment and pay the
WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 90-105 (3d ed. 1996); DAVID G. EPSTEIN
& STEVE H. NICKLEs, DEBT 27-32 (1994); STEFAN A. RIESENFELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTOR'S PROTECTION 217-40 (4th ed. 1987); VERN COUNTRYMAN,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 9-25 (2d ed. 1974). A lengthy and useful
annotation is David J. Marchitefli, Sufficiency, as to Content, of Notice of Garnishment Required
to be Served upon Garnishee, 20 A.L.R.5th 229 (1995).
4. Garnishment is entirely a statutory remedy and state statutes vary considerably one from
another. For the present purposes, it seems unnecessary to cite any specific state's statute for
these basic propositions. For general discussions, see supra texts cited in note 3. For more
specific discussions, see Robert Laurence, Recent Developments in the Arkansas Law of
Garnishment, A Compendium of the Pertinent Cases and Statutes, 1992 ARK. L. NOTES 39;
Robert Laurence, North Dakota's New Rules Respecting Garnishment and the Property Exempt
Therefrom, 58 N.D. L. REV. 183 (1982).
5. For a rigorous statement of this principle, see Hatcher v. Plumley, 164 N.W. 698 (N.D.
1917).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Bollinger Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 496 (N.D.
Tex. 1980).
7. See generally, Howard W. Brill et al., A More-or-Less Accurate Rendition of a Faculty
Dialogue on Commercial Paper, Garnishment, Interpleader, Intervention, Creditor's Bills and,
If You Can Believe It, Bills of Peace, 1986 ARK. L. NOTES 61.
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debt to whomever the court orders. Assuming that the garnishee in fact owes
the defendant money as wages, money in a bank account, money for goods
or services received, money lent by the debtor, money for breach of contract
or any of the other debts that one might garnish, the garnishee is a neutral
party, unconcerned with whom he or she pays.
While theoretically one can garnish any debt owing.to the defendant, in
practice nearly all garnishments are of one of three types of debts: (1) where
the defendant's employer is garnished, seeking the defendant's wages payable
or to become payable; (2) where the defendant's bank is garnished, seeking
the money in the defendant's deposit accounts; or (3) where the defendant's
account debtors are garnished, seeking accounts receivable or to become
receivable. As mentioned above, traditionally the garnishor could not reach
contingent liabilities, so unearned wages were beyond the reach of a
garnishor, and a new garnishment was required each pay period. Recently,
though, state legislatures have responded by enacting special statutory
provisions to reach future wages. Such statutes are not uncommon, but
hardly universal.8 Less commonly, one may garnish contingent tax refunds.'
On the other hand, it is almost never the case that a garnishment will
reach moneys deposited in a bank account after the answer to the writ; in
fact, some states do not even allow the garnishment to reach deposits after
service but before answer."0 The garnishor may reach immature obligationh
that are not strictly "receivable." However, a garnishor may not reach
accounts as yet entirely unearned, for example by garnishing the obligation
to pay for goods or services that may or may not be provided by the
defendant to the garnishee in the future.
Garnishment and Federal Indian Law
Now take these general garnishment principles and move them on or near
an Indian reservation, as in the hypothetical first stated. Where and how
might Mesa City Dodge enforce its off-reservation judgment against Avila?
On-reservation Garnishment in Tribal Court: Full Faith and Credit Issues
Should Mesa City Dodge, against all expectations, decide to use Tewa
tribal court to enforce its state court judgment, then the issues presented to
state court are those of cross-boundary enforcement of judgments. Basically,
three approaches to this problem have been offered. First, there are those
scholars who have advocated, and a few courts which have held, that tribes
8. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-110-415(b) (1987).
9. Under 31 U.S.C. § 3720A(a) (1994), federal income tax refunds may be seized to pay
a valid debt owed to a government agency. See Johnson v. United States, No. 91-6194, 1992 U.S.
App. LEXIS 34840 (6th Cir. 1992) (listed in Table of Cases at 983 F.2d 1066).
10. See DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 68 (3d ed. 1987).
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must give full faith and credit to state judgments and by states to tribal
judgments." Full faith and credit, which, of course, exists among the states
by constitutional command, requires, with very few exceptions, the
enforcement of foreign judgments.
Second, proposed, perhaps, by fewer scholars, but accepted by more
courts, is the notion that comity should apply between and among tribes and
states. Comity is a more flexible requirement than full faith and credit, in
which the receiving court shows a generalized respect for the issuing regime,
but is not commanded to enforce the judgment. As the United States
Supreme Court has said:
Comity in the legal sense is neither a matter of absolute
obligation on the one hand nor of mere courtesy and good will
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws. 3
Professor Nell Jessup Newton lists four "preconditions" to enforcement
of a foreign judgment under principles of comity: (1) Subject matter and
personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the court rendering the judgment;
(2) no fraud against the foreign court by the plaintiff; (3) a fundamentally
fair foreign proceeding; and (4) a broad consistency between the foreign
judgment and local policy.' As Professor Newton notes, the fourth
requirement threatens to "swallow the whole rule,"'5 unless moderated, and
she suggests that the court receiving the foreign judgment ought to presume
that the fourth requirement is met unless enforcement would "shock the
conscience of the community in which enforcement is sought."'
11. See Richard E. Ransom et al., Recognizing and Enforcing State and Tribal Judgments:
A Roundtable Discussion of Law, Policy, and Practice, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 239, 241-47
(1993) (remarks of Professor Clinton). The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe recently opted to apply
full faith and credit. See Eberhard v. Eberhard, 24 Indian L. Rep. 6059 (Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribal Ct. App. 1997).
12. The Full Faith and Credit Clause is found in U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I. This constitutional
provision is implemented by 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994), which is broader in its statutory full faith
and credit command than is the Constitution itself. This broader command is constitutional. See
Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3 (1882). In regards to full faith and credit as it generally applies to
the states, see ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CoNFLICTs LAW 215-49 (4th ed. 1986).
13. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1894). Regarding the comity that is due by states
to foreign-nation judgments, see generally LEFLAR, supra note 12, at 249-53.
14. See Ransom, supra note 11, at 250-55 (remarks of Professor Newton). The Ninth Circuit
recently opted for comity. See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997).
15. Id. at 252.
16. Id.
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Finally, there is the so-called "asymmetric" solution, to which I am the
only public adherent, which holds that whatever the rule is it should not
require that tribes treat state judgments identically to the way states treat
tribal judgments. This asymmetric solution rules out "full faith and credit,"
which is the prototypically symmetric solution to the problem of cross-
boundary enforcement. The asymmetric solution is consistent with comity
as long as it is not required that all jurisdictions apply comity identically.
My own particular brand of asymmetric comity would allow a tribe a more
sensitive inspection of the merits of an off-reservation judgment than
Professor Newton's conscience-shocking inspection. 7
Actually, Professor Newton's own definition of comity contains a certain
asymmetry, as who is to say that two different courts will have their
consciences shocked in perfect symmetry? In fact, one would expect the
much smaller and more fragile on-reservation tribal community to be more
easily shocked than the more diverse, larger, and younger off-reservation
community. Courts need to guard against the inclination to retaliate against
one another for the failures to exhibit shock at the same incident.
The states are divided on the question of full faith and credit and comity,
with a majority of those who have decided the issue opting for comity.'"
Federal courts only rarely become involved in the issues, which usually have
to do with the enforcement of private money judgments, because there is no
appeal from tribal court decisions into the federal system and because few
federal collateral attacks are allowed on the procedure or the merits of tribal
court civil-side litigation.19 Finally, because of the hit-and-miss nature of
tribal court reporting, it is difficult to determine the approach to cross-
boundary enforcement of any particular tribe. Thus, the law of cross-
boundary enforcement is in a state of some disarray, with no help in sight.
Recently the Court of Appeals of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe found
itself bound by the full faith and credit provision of the federal Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act, and gave a strong indication that it was ready
to find itself also bound by the more general full faith and credit provisions
of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 which is applicable to all final money judgments."9 For
17. See id. at 247-50 (remarks of Professor Laurence).
18. Compare Shepard v. Shepard, 655 P.2d 895 (Idaho 1982); In re Adoption of Buehl
(Duckhead v. Anderson), 555 P.2d 1334 (Wash. 1976); Jim v. C.I.T. Financial Services Corp.,
533 P.2d 751 (N.M. 1975) (all applying full faith and credit) with Desjarlait v. Desjarlait, 379
N.W. 2d 139 (Minn. App. 1985); Mexican v. Circle Bear, 370 N.W. 2d 737 (S.D. 1985); Wippert
v. Blackfeet Tribe, 654 P.2d 512 (Mont. 1982); Malaterre v. Malaterre, 293 N.W.2d 139 (N.D.
1980); Red Fox v. Red Fox, 542 P.2d 918 (Or. App. 1975); In re Estate of Lynch, 377 P.2d 199
(Ariz. 1962) (all applying some form of comity). Citations to cases and articles on the issue are
exhaustively collected in Eberhard v. Eberhard, 24 Indian L. Rep. 6059, 6065 n.3 (Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribal Ct. App. 1997).
19. Santa Clam Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
20. Eberhard v. Eberhard, 24 Indian L. Rep. 6059 (Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Ct. App.
[Vol. 22360
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reasons set out in detail elsewhere,2' the Cheyenne River Sioux court was
wrong to bind itself to federal full faith and credit requirements more
applicable to states of the Union. The recitation of the details will not occur
here; they have to do generally with the questions of whether a
congressionally imposed regime of cross-boundary enforcement impinges on
tribal sovereignty (it does) and whether the rules of statutory construction
should allow Congress to legislate with respect to Indian tribes without
mentioning Indian tribes in either the statute or the legislative history (they
should not).
For now it is enough to note that the present hypothetical shows just how
smoothly a full fledged full faith and credit regime just might work. Full
faith and credit is nothing, in fact, if not efficient: Mesa City Dodge will
take its off-reservation default judgment to tribal court and "domesticate" it,
that is, turn it into a Tewa judgment. Full faith and credit principles would
severely limit the Tewa court in the collateral review it could give to the off-
reservation judgment. In particular, it could not inspect whether the merits
of the lawsuit were seriously at odds with strong Tewa public policy. As Dr.
Leflar writes with respect to state-to-state full faith and credit: "The local
public policy of the second state, however strong it may be, is not a ground
for denying full faith and credit to a valid sister state judgment."'
Thus, for example, the court could not consider any differences, no matter
how profound, between Tewa and New Mexico philosophies regarding the
occasions for and the manner of obtaining default judgments under a full
faith and credit regime. Courts using full faith and credit should not and
could not inquire into substantive matters regarding the legitimacy of
deficiency judgments, in general, or regarding the connection between steps
taken in the enforcement of the judgment and the entitlement to the
deficiency judgment, or in the connection between steps taken in the creation
of contract and steps taken in its enforcement. And so on.
Rather, the tribal court, under federal full faith and credit rules, is limited
to deciding whether the New Mexico court had jurisdiction over the
underlying cause of action. Since Avila bought her car off-reservation and
took delivery of it off-reservation, the state court surely had jurisdiction to
decide the contract dispute, and the garnishor could enforce a deficiency
judgment on-reservation under full faith and credit principles against any of
the garnishees mentioned in the hypothetical.
It is more sensible and more in keeping with the grand doctrines of tribal
sovereignty and self-determination, for the tribal court to retain the kind of
1997) (construing 28 U.S.C § 1738A (1994), the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act).
21. See Robert Laurence, Full Faith and Credit in Tribal Courts: An Essay on Tribal
Sovereignty, Cross-Boundary Reciprocity and the Unlikely Case of Eberhard v. Eberhard, 28 N.M.
L. REV. (forthcoming 1997).
22. LEFLAR, supra note 12, at 224.
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enforcement discretion which is available under a comity regime, but which
is impossible under a strict full faith and credit regime. The state should
retain some similar, though asymmetric, discretion when it receives a tribal
judgment for enforcement.' The Tewa tribal court, then, would become
something more than a mere collection agency for off-reservation car dealers
and would make inquiry into whether Mesa City Dodge's judgment should
be enforced.
It is in order to avoid this tribal court inquiry that Mesa City Dodge might
well wish to enforce its judgment under New Mexico, not Tewa, process. A
discussion of the issues raised in that event follows.
On-reservation Garnishment in State Court: Williams v. Lee Issues
Suppose that, instead of using tribal process and facing these difficult full
faith and credit issues, Mesa City Dodge determines to use state garnishment
process. The least complicated legal issue is tackled first, albeit in the
context of the least likely practical scenario: Suppose the judgment creditor
tries to use New Mexico process to reach the debt owed to Avila by the
Tewa Potters' Cooperative, the on-reservation business that owes Avila
money due to its sales of her pottery. The attempt should fail, under the
holdings and reasoning of Williams v. Lee' and Joe v. Marcum.'
"Absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been
whether the state action infringes upon the rights of the reservation Indians
to make their own laws and be ruled by them."' Thus reads the Williams
v. Lee infringement test, arguably the most well-known pronouncement of
the modem Court in the field of Indian law. The test, clearly, contains two
branches: Supremacy and Infringement. The post-Williams Court prefers
Supremacy:
[T]he trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian
sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on
federal pre-emption. The modem cases thus tend to avoid
reliance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to look
instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which define the
limits of state power.
Public Law 280 is the only Act of Congress with any application to the
enforcement of judgment question, and it serves to grant state jurisdiction,
23. The state inquiry would be based on compliance by the tribal court with the Indian Civil
Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301-1303 (1994). See Ransom, supra note 11, at 247-50 (remarks of
Professor Laurence).
24. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
25. 621 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1980).
26. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
27. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (citation omitted).
362 [Vol. 22
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not to preempt it.28 In those states which were given authority over Indian
country, and in those which took it voluntarily under the statute (lately, only
with the tribes' consentS), Williams v. Lee is legislatively overruled, at least
with respect to the application of state rules of decision in state courts.
Hence, state courts may take jurisdiction over disputes regarding reservation
transactions in Public Law 280 states, and they may grant judgments. The
garnishor could enforce those judgments on the reservation. The statute,
however, prohibits the attachment or encumbrance of property held in
trust,3' even in Public Law 280 states, so enforcement must ordinarily
proceed against non-trust personal property only.
In non-Public Law 280 states, the issue, as always, is whether the on-
reservation enforcement, under state law, of a valid state court judgment
contravenes the Williams infringement test.32 That it does becomes plain
when one realizes that the enforcement of a judgment implicates local laws
and governmental policies that are entirely unrelated to the matters that were
the subject of the off-reservation trial. The following are all areas in which
conflicting determinations might arise between state and tribal courts: the
exact role in the execution process of the sheriff or other enforcement
officer, the susceptibility or not of certain property to execution, the kinds
and extent of hearings that are available to challenge enforcement
procedures, the need or not for the enforcing officer to have a search warrant
while executing, the method of sale or other disposition of the property
seized to satisfy the judgment, the existence and length of any redemption
period. Surely the use, say, of a state's three-month redemption period
following a sheriffs sale, when the tribe's choice is one year, or the use of
a state's rule imposing excessive penalties on defaulting garnishees, while the
tribe was more forgiving of such a default, would "infringe upon the rights
of the reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."33
One must concede that, at this time, relatively few tribal codes contain
much law on the enforcement topics listed above. Is there an infringement
when a tribe has not enacted its own enforcement of judgment laws? It was
the square holding of Joe v. Marcum that a New Mexico wage
garnishment, where the garnishee was a non-Indian business, failed the
infringement test, notwithstanding the absence of a Navajo garnishment
28. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162,
25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326, 28 U.S.C. § 1360, 1360 note (1994)).
29. Id.
30. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1994); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321(b), 1322(b) (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b)
(1994).
32. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
33. Id.
34. 621 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1980).
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statute, which the court characterized as "the Navajo policy, as the tribal
code does not provide for garnishment."35
Joe v. Marcum was carefully writtert not to sweep more broadly than
actually needed. The Tenth Circuit noted that the Navajo legal system is
complex and sophisticated, in the dominant-society sense. The Navajo Code
contains several other enforcement devices, but not wage garnishments.
Wage garnishment, the court noted, "is a matter upon which there is no
unanimity of thought,"' which is indeed true; Florida, for example, does not
allow the garnishment of wages." Furthermore, "[g]arnishment is a
statutory remedy, which does not exist at common law."'"
Joe v. Marcum is a sensible decision, well received by other
jurisdictions, 9 and should not be limited to these narrowing circumstances;
that is to say, one should not view the case as merely a Navajo garnishment
case. "The right of the reservation Indians to make their own laws and be
ruled by them," at least in the area of the enforcement of judgments, should
include the right to be silent about remedies that are thought not needed or
are thought subject to abuse. As Margery H. Brown and Brenda C. Desmond
have written:
A matter may be of great concern to a tribe, yet the tribe may
have no written law in that area and the tribal court may not be
adjudicating cases in that area. Tribal legislative authority
certainly includes the decision not to legislate or, more
significantly perhaps, the decision not to put unwritten customary
law into writing.'
Even where the states are in agreement with respect to the appropriateness
of the remedy, a court should hesitate to find, absent clear evidence of a kind
unlikely to exist, that tribal silence is meant to indicate adoption of the
accepted dominant-society rule. The conversion of judgments into money by
the involuntary seizure and sale of the defendant's property is a phenomenon
not without controversy; there is the constant potential for harassment and
the continual likelihood of violence. On the other side, creditors are not
being paid voluntarily and the effectiveness of the tribal process will have
an impact on the entire tribe's ability to do business off-reservation. From
35. Id. at 361-62.
36. Id. at 361.
37. FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. XV, § 222.11 (West 1989).
38. Joe, 621 F.2d at 361.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 754 F. Supp. 185, 187 (D.N.M. 1991); State v. Zaman
(Tahirkhafli), 927 P.2d 347, 351 (Ariz. App. 1996); People v. Superior Court, Jans, Real Party
in Interest, 274 Cal. Rptr. 586, 589 (Cal. App. 1990).
40. Margery H. Brown & Brenda C. Desmond, Montana Tribal Courts: Influencing the
Development of Contemporary Indian Law, 52 MoNT. L. REV. 211, 282-83 (1991).
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both sides, then, there are abundant reasons to allow the tribes plenty of
room to "make their own laws and be ruled by them."4
Professor Frank Pommersheim, of the University of South Dakota, calls
this the "no law" issue."' Discussing Joe v. Marcum, as well as other cases,
he concluded that the Tenth Circuit's analysis in Joe v. Marcum is the correct
one. As he makes the point:
Such state or federal law may conflict with tribal tradition and
culture. In other words, the apparent absence of tribal law, in
some instances, is not a void, but rather a well-considered tribal
public policy judgment.43
"[I]n some instances."" But which instances? Litigators and judges will
look in vain for the kind of tribal legislative history that might lead to an
answer. That history, if it exists, might well be in a language that most
lawyers and judges do not speak. Expert witnesses, perhaps testifying in an
Indian tongue, could provide evidence of tribal custom and tradition, but
such evidence is unlikely to reveal whether it is consistent with custom that
a period of redemption following a sheriffs sale of the defendant's pickup
exists or whether it is customary to impose a substantial penalty on a
defaulting garnishee.
Hence, my approach is not as generous to state law as the one taken by
Professor Pommersheim. Whether in the presence or the absence of codified
tribal enforcement law, the state sheriff should not enforce even a valid state
judgment on the reservation. Enforcement should occur through the tribal
court system, as discussed in the previous section.
But what, Professor Pommersheim wonders, if there is no tribal method
of enforcement and the method is noncontroversial among the states? He
asks:
This all seems correct, but what if there were state unanimity in
permitting garnishment? Would this preclude tribal law to the
contrary? The [Joe v. Marcum] court's holding might then begin
to wobble, as it did in the analogous situation in Little Horn
State Bank v. Stops[45] in Montana where the Crow Tribal Court
did not provide for honoring state court judgments. There the
Montana Supreme Court found no infringement of tribal
41. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
42. Frank Pommersheim, The Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of Tribal
Jurisdiction, 31 ARIZ. L. REv. 330, 351-55 (1989).
43. Id. at 353-54.
44. Id.
45. 555 P.2d 211 (Mont. 1976).
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sovereignty, and permitted a state writ of execution to be
enforced against tribal members on the reservation. '
Stops is an unfortunate case, on facts similar to Joe v. Marcum, except
that execution, not garnishment was involved. At the heart of the opinion is
the Montana Supreme Court's view that a judgment that is not enforceable
was "absurd."47 This was not a fair characterization; many judgment-proof
defendants exist, and while this is unfortunate for all parties, it is not
"absurd." Furthermore, being judgment proof does not merely reflect an
embarrassed debtor's financial position. It also reflects equally on the
enforcing state's exemption laws, and only the most hard-boiled of creditors
consider exemptions to be "absurd." Furthermore, bankruptcy makes
judgments generally unenforceable in a way that is hardly "absurd.""
Viewed ftom this vantage point, one could characterize the Williams v. Lee
protection against on-reservation enforcement under state process as a federal
exemption, protecting reservation property from valid state court judgments,
but not from tribal court recognition of those judgments.49 Stops, then,
based as it was on the perceived "absurd[ity]" of a result that is in fact both
common and common-sensical, was ultimately unpersuasive. The lack of
dominant-society enforcement devices should not allow execution or
garnishment to proceed on-reservation under state law, under the control of
the state deputy sheriff. Once again, on-reservation enforcement belongs in
tribal court.
Off-reservation Garnishment in State Court: Shaffer v. Heitner Issues
Now suppose Mesa City Dodge forsakes Tewa enforcement process, for
reasons sensible to it, thereby avoiding any direct application of tribal-court
full faith and credit issues, first discussed. Suppose, too, that the creditor
does not attempt to use state enforcement process to reach an on-reservation
defendant or garnishee, thereby avoiding the Joe v. Marcum and Little Horn
State Bank v. Stops issues just discussed. Suppose instead that Mesa City
Dodge sues out its writ of garnishment against one of the off-reservation
46. Pommersheim, supra note 42, at 352.
47. Stops, 555 P.2d at 215.
48. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1994) (exemptions); id. § 524 (discharge).
49. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1994) (listing property that is exempt in federal court but not
in state court). Regarding the legitimacy of on-reservation enforcement underfederal process, see
Annis v. Dewey County Bank, 335 F. Supp. 133 (D.S.D. 1971). That case permitted the federal
marshal to enforce a federal money judgment against the debtor's on-reservation property. Given
the absence of any federal enforcement process, and the requirement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)
that the marshal use state enforcement process and state exemption law, the Annis result is
unfortunate. See the discussion in Robert Laurence, The Enforcement of Judgments across Indian
Reservation Boundaries: Full Faith and Credit, Comity, and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 OR.
L. REv. 589, 607-47 (1990).
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businesses - Global Mining, First Federal or Garcia's Pawn Shop - in an
off-reservation state court, New Mexico or otherwise. The Indian-law
ramifications of the full faith and credit issue disappear. for now it is a state
court enforcing a state court judgment - most straightforwardly, a New
Mexico court enforcing a New Mexico court judgment, with no full faith and
credit questions at all. Here, the application of Williams v. Lee and Joe v.
Marcum is less clear. What result?
Federal law should forbid the garnishment of Global Mining, if Avila's
wages were earned on-reservation, of First Federal if her money was
deposited anywhere except at the automatic teller machine, and of Garcia's
Pawn Shop, if her pottery was delivered on-reservation. Garcia's, on the
other hand, is reachable for the pottery that is in the off-reservation pawn
shop, and for Avila's account receivable which arose off-reservation. In other
words, federal law should prevent the garnishment from going on under state
law if the garnishor seeks an asset that has some substantial reservation
connection, and should permit it if there is some substantial connection
between the property and the state.
This result runs counter to an old common law tradition that says that the
garnishment may proceed wherever the plaintiff finds the garnishee. This,
in fact, was the holding of the once-venerable Harris v. Balk. In that case,
Harris owed $180 to Balk and Balk owed $300 to Epstein. Harris lived in
North Carolina but visited Baltimore, where Epstein resided. Epstein
garnished Harris to reach the debt that Harris owed to Balk, Epstein's debtor.
Harris did not contest the garnishment, and judgment was entered in favor
of Epstein against Harris for $180, which judgment Harris duly paid. Balk
then sued Harris in North Carolina for the same $180. Harris defended on
the Maryland judgment, which, he argued, was entitled to full faith and
credit in North Carolina. The trial court found for Balk, on the grounds that
there had been no jurisdiction in Maryland to support the garnishment. The
Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed, but the United States Supreme
Court reversed:
If there be a law of the State providing for the attachment of the
debt, then if the garnishee [Harris] be found in that State, and
process be personally served upon him therein, we think the
court thereby acquires jurisdiction over him [Harris] there, and
can garnish [on behalf of Epstein] the debt due from him
[Harris] to the debtor of the plaintiff [Balk], and condemn it,
provided the garnishee [Harris] could himself be sued by his
creditor [Balk] in that state.5'
50. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
51. Id. at 221.
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By analogy, under Harris v. Balk, Mesa City Dodge could garnish Global
Mining, First Federal Savings Bank and/or Garcia's Pawn Shop in any state
court where they were subject to suit. This is called "the Harris v. Balk
debt-follows-the-debtor rule," and it held sway, both before and after
judgment, for many years.
However, this rule's application to the hypothetical under discussion is
limited for two reasons: (1) it is an outmoded doctrine that does not survive
modern constitutional analysis; and (2) even if the old doctrine were
generally good law, paramount federal concerns should prohibit its use when
the asset is on-reservation.
The modem objection to the old tradition emanates from the case of
Shaffer v. Heitner.' Shaffer is a prejudgment garnishment case where
shareholders of Greyhound, Inc. sought to hold directors of the corporation
liable for antitrust violations that occurred in Oregon. Greyhound
Corporation is incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business
in Arizona.' Greyhound Lines, Inc., the subsidiary which had allegedly
been in violation of the antitrust laws, is incorporated in California, with its
principal place of business in Arizona.' The plaintiff and individual
defendants were residents of various states; none of them lived in
Delaware.' Jurisdiction was sought in Delaware by garnishing the shares
of the corporation owned by the defendants; Delaware law said that those
shares were located in Delaware.'
The United States Supreme Court held that in the prejudgment situation,
due process concerns worked a major constraint on the old rule that allowed
the garnishment to go on wherever one found the garnishee. The
Constitution requires that there be at least minimum contacts between the
defendant and the forum in which the suit was being brought, and that
jurisdiction otherwise be established in a way that comports with "fair play
and substantial justice."'
Now, it is true that the Court itself seemed to think that there was no real
constitutional problem if the garnishment were to occur after rather than
52. 43:1 U.S. 186 (1977). For a good general discussion of Shaffer, see Michael B. Mushlin,
The New Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction: New York's Revival of a Doctrine Whose Time Has Passed,
55 BROOK. L. REv. 1059 (1990). For a list of other articles on Shaffer, see id. at 1061 n.13. For
a student comment attempting to refute Professor Mushlin's position, see Comment: Shaffer,
Burnham and New York's Continuing Use of QIR-2 Jurisdiction: A Resurrection of the Power
Theory, 45 EMORY L.J. 239 (1996).
53. Shuffer, 433 U.S. at 189.
54. Id. at 189 n.1.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 192; see 8 DEL. CODE § 169 (1991). See generally Louis J. Finger, Stocks and
Dividends, in R. FRANKLIN BALOTri & JESSE A. FINKEL5TEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATONs 245 (1988).
57. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945)).
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before judgment, as in the hypothetical case. It was the opinion of the Court,
written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, that:
Once it has been determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction that the defendant is a debtor of the plaintiff, there
would seem to be no unfairness in allowing an action to realize
on that debt in a State where the defendant has property, whether
or not that State would have jurisdiction to determine the
existence of the debt as an original matter."8
This statement was truly the "opinion" of the Court, for it was dicta in the
purest sense, where the Court was speculating on the impact of the present
decision on a case not then before it. Such speculation, of course, can go
awry, as the Court may have been thinking of an easy future case, rather
than a hard one. In footnote 36, the Court was probably imagining the case
of a straightforward execution against tangible personal property, and not an
attempt to reach, via garnishment process in one jurisdiction, wages that
were earned in another. Few challenges have arisen to execution in the
jurisdiction where real property or tangible personal property was found,
assuming it was not exempt in the jurisdiction. 9
For instance, Bank of Babylon v. Quirk' was a well-decided case. There,
the bank was permitted to use Connecticut execution process to reach Quirk's
boat, which was docked in Connecticut, to enforce a New York judgment
against a Tennessee resident. Quirk, of course, involved enforcement against
tangible personal property, a boat, whose location was easily established. It
is here that Justice Marshall's dicta from Shaffer's footnote 36 seems entirely
correct: "[T]here would seem to be no unfairness in allowing an action to
realize on that debt in a State where the defendant has property, whether or
not that State would have jurisdiction to determine the existence of the debt
as an original matter."6
In other words, it was immaterial whether the Bank of Babylon could or
could not have sued Quirk originally in Connecticut, as it was immaterial
whether the boat had any connection whatsoever to the bank's underlying
cause of action. Proper jurisdiction presumably lay in New York, and if it
did not, its absence was raisable collaterally by Quirk in the Connecticut
enforcement action.' Assuming the New York's jurisdiction over Quirk was
valid under constitutional due process requirements, full faith and credit
58. Id. at 210 n.36.
59. States use their own exemption laws. See LEFLAR, supra note 12, at 335.
60. 472 A.2d 21 (Conn. 1984).
61. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 210 n.36.
62. See LEFLAR, supra note 12, at 236. This is the major exception to the full faith and
credit rule, which generally prohibits collateral attacks on the judgment to be made in the
enforcing state.
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required that Connecticut enforce it against the boat, unless boats were
exempt in Connecticut, which they are not.
Suppose the Bank had been trying to reach Quirk's wages, earned in
Tennessee working for an employer whose corporate headquarters were in
Connecticut, say the Connecticut General Life and Casualty Insurance
Company. Or, to make the connection between Quirk and Connecticut even
weaker, suppose Quirk worked in Tennessee for an employer principally
located in Arkansas, incorporated in Delaware, but which conducted business
in Connecticut, say Wal-Mart, Inc. Now one may have difficulty seeing the
sense of the dicta in footnote 36. Giving a Tennessee defendant a fully fair
trial on the underlying cause of action in New York may well comport with
the requirements of International Shoe. However, the appropriateness comes
into question when state enforcement process goes on without any due
process restraints in a state with which the defendant has such an attenuated
connection.
When post-judgment process attempts to reach something as intangible as
wages payable, the constitutional dimensions of the problem change
dramatically, a point that the dicta in footnote 36 missed. Constitutional "fair
play and substantial justice" should now be required both for the garnishee
- who is the nominal defendant in the garnishment - and the original
defendant, who is the real party in interest. That is to say, a garnishment is
only proper in a jurisdiction which has the constitutionally minimum contacts
with both the garnishee and the defendant.
In Quirk itself, that jurisdiction was most plainly Connecticut, where the
boat was located. In the hypothetical Quirk, where the Bank of Babylon is
seeking Quirk's wages, jurisdiction exists most plainly in Tennessee, where
the wages were earned, or, somewhat less plainly, New York, where the
original cause of action was brought, if the garnishee is reachable there.
Creative forum shopping, seeking the most obscure place where one can find
an intangible asset and where the most liberal garnishment laws and the most
grudging exemption laws prevail, needs constitutional control.
In comparison to Quirk, consider State ex rel. Department of Revenue v.
Control Data Corporation.' The Oregon Tax Court rendered a judgment
against one Brest, a resident of Oregon who worked there for Control Data.
The judgment was not paid voluntarily and Brest moved to Minnesota, where
he remained an employee of Control Data. Following the move, the
Department of Revenue sought a share of Brest's wages, earned in
Minnesota, by garnishing Control Data in Oregon.' The Oregon Supreme
Court permitted the garnishment to proceed, in the face of a Shaffer
63. 713 P.2d 30 (Or. 1986) (en banc).
64. For a short discussion of the problem of the garnishment of an out-of-state corporation
under a state long-arm statute, see Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Shaffer v. Heitner: Holding,
Implications, Forebodings, 30 HASTINGs L.J. 1183, 1195-96 (1979).
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challenge, citing footnote 36 and holding exactly as the Supreme Court
suggested in that footnote:
Here the creditor, the Department of Revenue, did not attach
assets in the forum state as a way of getting jurisdiction to
adjudicate a claim against an absent debtor. This creditor already
has a judgment against the debtor, a judgment for unpaid taxes
on income earned in Oregon while the debtor lived in Oregon.
The Department seeks only to collect this judgment by reaching
an asset belonging to the debtor in the hands of Control Data, a
third party that unquestionably is present in Oregon.'
This paragraph does not show that Brest was unworthy of a post-judgment
hearing on the constitutional validity of the garnishment. Rather it shows
that in such a hearing the garnishor could easily demonstrate that Brest had
the minimum contacts with Oregon necessary under International Shoe for
the garnishment to occur. There was no surprise to Brest that a garnishment
against him would transpire in Oregon, even after he moved to Minnesota
and kept working for the same company. Difficulties would arise in the case
if, on moving to Minnesota, he went to work, say, as a clerk at Wal-Mart
and the garnishment were then brought in, say, Delaware, where Wal-Mart
is incorporated, or in, say, Arkansas, where Wal-Mart has its principal place
of business, or in, say, Kansas, where Wal-Mart transacts sufficient business
to be susceptible to service of process.
Control Data's result, then, was correct, but it proved too much by
suggesting that footnote 36 meant precisely what it said in all circumstances.
The "too much" that it proved was that Harris v. Balk is still good law, after
judgment. Levi Strauss & Co. v. Crockett Motor Sales, Inc.,' is a better
case, because it contradicted that suggestion and did not cite Shaffer's dicta-
laden footnote 36 at all. (Shaffer, itself, was cited.67) Crockett sued Penn,
an Arkansas resident, in Arkansas court, and won. The judgment was not
paid voluntarily and Crockett garnished Levi Strauss, Penn's employer. Two
garnishments went on without objection, before Levi Strauss closed its'
Arkansas plant where Penn had worked. Penn moved to Tennessee and
continued in the employment of Levi Strauss there. When the third
garnishment was commenced in Arkansas against Levi Strauss (which was
still susceptible to service based on other plants in Arkansas), the garnishee
objected. Held: the third garnishment was proper:
In considering the situation here in view of the Shaffer
holding, we have no difficulty in deciding that Penn, a non-
65. Control Data, 713 P.2d at 32.
66. 739 S.W.2d 157 (Ark. 1987).
67. Id. at 159.
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resident defendant, had sufficient contacts with Arkansas and the
litigation here to sustain the court's jurisdiction in this matter....
Unquestionably, Penn was present in Arkansas and had sufficient
contacts for Crockett to obtain the judgment against her, and due
process does not require a renewal of each of those contacts with
this state in order that Crockett can collect on that judgment.
[Citing Control Data.] Suffice it to say, Penn's contacts, past and
present, with this state are sufficient for us to sustain the trial
court's exercise of jurisdiction in the garnishment proceeding
below. s
As with the cited Control Data, the result here is the correct one. In
Crockett Motor Sales, the analysis as well as the result was correct, for it
appears in the last sentence quoted that the Arkansas Supreme Court was
undertaking a brief due process inspection of the "fair play and substantial
justice" of the garnishment, notwithstanding that there had been plenty of
Penn-Arkansas contact to support the exercise of jurisdiction in the
underlying case. Thus Crockett Motor Sales was subtly, and properly,
inconsistent with the dicta found in Shaffer's footnote 36.' "Fair play and
substantial justice" should function as the hallmark of postjudgment
enforcement process when the plaintiff tries to reach the defendant's
intangible property.
The Crockett Motor Sales case arose at a time when repeated
garnishments were necessary in Arkansas to reach wages as they became
payable, hence the cross-boundary question arose on the third garnishment.
Today, the law is simpler, as one garnishment reaches all future wages, until
the judgment is paid.!' Under the present statute, once a wage garnishment
had begun against Levi Strauss in Arkansas, it would continue against the
same employer, without surprise to Penn, wherever Penn moved, while still
working for Levi Strauss. It is another question whether, if Penn went to
work for Wal-Mart in Tennessee, a new Arkansas garnishment against those
wages would withstand a constitutional attack. It is yet another question
whether, if Penn went to work for Connecticut General Life and Casualty in
68. Id.
69. John Hundley of the Illinois Bar thinks otherwise. See John T. Hundley, Long Arms and
Foreign Pockets, C.B.A. REc. 24 (September 1990). The article states:
Shaffer brushed off post-judgment issues in a footnote [citing footnote 36] and
post-Shaffer cases have followed that lead. Two states have confined Shaffer and
Rush [v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980)] to the pre-judgment context and allowed
wages being earned by a former resident in another state to be garnished by
serving papers on the employer's forum-state office or agent [citing Crockett Motor
Sales and Control Data].
Id. at 27.
70. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-110-415(b) (1987).
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Tennessee, the Constitution would allow a garnishment in Hawai'i, where
Connecticut General does business.
One case that held proper such far-reaching garnishments was Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ruby.7' The Rubys obtained a Maryland divorce in
1984. Mr. Ruby moved to Texas where he went to work for Goodyear and
began to default on the obligations under his divorce decree. Ms. Ruby then
garnished Goodyear in Maryland in order to reach her ex-husband's Texas
wages, Goodyear being reachable by Maryland process as a business doing
business in Maryland. Goodyear, at Mr. Ruby's prompting, objected to the
garnishment.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held first that
whether viewed from the constitutional perspective of due
process or the requirements of Maryland Rule 1-321, Mrs.
Ruby's request for a wage lien was not an additional claim for
relief requiring new in-state service on Mr. Ruby. The right to
exercise personal jurisdiction over Mr. Ruby arose when he was
served with the original complaint, and extended to all the relief
sought by that complaint. Moreover, the enforcement and
modification of relief granted pursuant to that complaint remains
within the continuing jurisdiction of the circuit court, subject to
any due process requirement that the party against whom the
modification or enforcement is sought be given reasonable notice
and an opportunity to be heard.'
The court then carefully analyzed whether service of notice of the
enforcement action by mail on Mr. Ruby in Texas was sufficient, deciding
that service was proper. The court ignored the more basic question of
whether there was any property at all in Maryland? Harris v. Balk would
have said that Mr. Ruby's wages tag along wherever Goodyear goes, but
Shaffer cast serious doubt on Harris,7 and seemingly added a constitutional
71. 540 A.2d 482 (Md. 1988).
72. Id. at 484.
73. Professor Riesenfeld does not believe that Harris was, in fact, overruled by Shaffer, in
that, he believes, both Balk and Harris had substantially more than "minimum contacts" with
Maryland. See Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Shaffer v. Heitner: Holding, Implications and Forebodings,
30 HASTINGs L.J. 1183, 1194 (1979). Professor Vernon agrees. See David H. Vernon, State-
Court Jurisdiction: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Impact of Shaffer v, Heitner, 63 IowA L. Rev.
997, 1013-14 (1978). Dr. Leflar disagrees, at least to the extent that the case is an example of
"the well-known debt-follows-the-debtor" rule. See LEFLAR, supra note 12, at 49.
Professor Riesenfeld writes:
Nothing in Shaffer v. Heitner impairs the teachings of Harris v. Balk with
respect to jurisdiction over the garnishee. Provided there is jurisdiction over the
absent defendant [Balk], jurisdiction over the garnishee [Harris] may be exercised
whenever there is in personam jurisdiction over him. Since transient presence of
the defendant and service during such presence has not yet been overturned as a
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dimension to that question. It might well have come as no "surprise" to Mr.
Ruby that he had not escaped the reach of Maryland process by fleeing to
Texas. The garnishor might have satisfied the requirements of International
Shoe as to Mr. Ruby, but the court should have paused to consider the
question.
As 0to Goodyear, the burden was on Ms. Ruby to show that Maryland had
jurisdiction over the corporation, and her showing was thin. The mere
presence of Goodyear stores in the state was not sufficient, the court noting
that those stores might be franchises.' In the end, the court allowed the
garnislment to proceed to the'discovery stage, confident that Ms. Ruby
would show that there was no surprise to Goodyear to learn it could be
garnished in Maryland."
Sirrdlar to Goodyear was Bianco v. Concepts "100, ' except that wages
were not involved there. In that case, a Pennsylvania creditor recovered
judgment in Pennsylvania against a New York corporation that transacted
business in Pennsylvania. The cause of action was products liability, or
strictly speaking in Pennsylvania, trespass to the person, a hair dryer having
malfunctioned. The judgment was not paid voluntarily and the plaintiff
garnished Foremost Insurance Company, the defendant's liability insurer.
Foremost Insurance was a Michigan company which owned no property in
Pennsylvania, and which had issued the policy covering Concepts "100" in
New York, but which was licensed to do business in Pennsylvania. The
insurance company objected to the garnishment and the trial court dismissed
the garnishment for lack of jurisdiction over the garnishee.
constitutionally acceptable basis for jurisdiction over individuals, such jurisdiction
also can be invoked by the gamishor [Epstein] as statutory representative of the
gamishee's creditors. Yet, despite the silence of Shaffer on that aspect of Harris
v. Balk, it would seem that a reexamination of these principles may be expected.
Id. at 1195.
This is a difficult paragraph to understand. If Professor Riesenfeld is referring to post-
judgment garnishment, then he is merely restating footnote 36. If he is referring to prejudgment
garnishment, then "[plrovided there is jurisdiction over [Balk]," there is no problem proceeding
with the lawsuit at all. In that case, the prejudgment garnishment would not be for the purpose
of establishing jurisdiction, but in order to preserve certain property, to wit, the gamishee's debt
to the defendant.
Incidently, Professor Riesenfeld's term "the statutory representative of the gamishee's
creditors" is his way of saying that the garnishor is statutorily able to tell the garnishee, on behalf
of the garnishee's creditors - in particular, the defendant - where and how to pay the debt. The
essence of the present complaint with footnote 36 is that due process should require an
opportunity for the defendant to object that that statutory designation is inappropriate, either
because the wrong state's statute is being used or because the right one is being misapplied.
74. Goodyear, 540 A.2d at 487.
75. Id.
76. 436 A.2d 206 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
77. Id. at 207.
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The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed, observing that: "[T]he
garnishable res is an intangible asset of the judgment debtor which may be
garnished only when the garnishee is subject to in personam jurisdiction."78
The court's holding was: "Appellant established that appellee had been
authorized to do business here for the last twenty-three years. Consequently,
appellee falls within the reach of Pennsylvania's jurisdictional statutes."'
There was no discussion of whether it would comport with fair play and
substantial justice to a New York defendant to have its Michigan insurer
garnished in Pennsylvania. As in Goodyear, a court might well find that the
garnishment threatens no International Shoe "surprise" to Concepts "100,"
since Pennsylvania was the forum for the original cause of action, but a
hearing to air the arguments should be constitutionally required.
Williamson v. Williamson' is a case showing the existence of proper
limits to the ability of a creative judgment creditor to reach wages earned.
Ms. Williamson, a resident of Georgia, obtained an Arizona divorce decree,
under which her ex-husband was in default. While he had once been a
resident of Georgia, he was now a resident of California, where he worked
for the Army. Ms. Williamson tried to use a Georgia garnishment to reach
Mr. Williamson's wages earned in California.
The Georgia Supreme Court held that, if Mr. Williamson had property in
Georgia, then footnote 36 allowed Ms. Williamson to reach it via Georgia
garnishment process pursuant to her Arizona decree. "Personal jurisdiction
over the defendant would, of course, not be required."8 However, and
important for the position of the present article, the Court further held that
she had failed to demonstrate that wages earned in California working for the
Army were located in Georgia for purposes of the Georgia garnishment
statutes.8
Harris v. Balk's debt-follows-the-debtor rule would place the location of
the wages wherever the Army is found, that is to say, everywhere. It is plain
that the difficulty with the debt-follows-the-debtor rule is that it does not
translate well from the Harris v. Balk case to cases such as Williamson,
Goodyear and Concepts "100." The garnishor could only find Harris, the
garnishee in the old case, an individual, in only one place at a time. If Harris
had been carrying Balk's gold pocket watch around with him, then the rule
would have made its clearest sense, and the garnishment could have
proceeded in whichever state Epstein could find Harris with Balk's watch.
Epstein found him in Maryland? Fine. Balk's protection? Keep the watch.
78. Id. at 210.
79. Id. at 212.
80. 275 S.E.2d 42 (Ga. 1981).
81. Id. at 45.
82. Id. at 46.
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The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, the Foremost Insurance Company
and the United States Army were corporate entities, capable of being in
many places at one time. Now, it was less clear that Goodyear's debt to Mr.
Ruby, or Foremost's debt to Concepts "100," or the Army's debt to Mr.
Williamson were or should have been capable of similar multiple locations.
The essence of Shaffer cautioned that aggressive application of the Harris
rule threatens its constitutionality. Williamson noted that a state can avoid
the constitutional implications by not accepting an aggressive use of at least
the corporate arm of the debt-follows-the-debtor rule under its own state
garnishment law.
Williamson, then, is a case showing a state court properly keeping control
of far-reaching garnishments under state law. This "Williamson issue" is also
seen in the question of whether, as a matter of state law, a garnishment of
a bank account must be done at the place of the original deposit, or if it can
go on wherever the bank is found. The jurisdictions are split."
For example, in Shinto Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Fibrex & Shipping Co.,
Inc.,' Shinto Shipping, a Japanese corporation, chartered a vessel to Fibrex,
an Oregon corporation. A dispute arose, and Shinto Shipping sought
arbitration in Japan, which Fibrex resisted. Shinto Shipping then sued Fibrex
in California to compel, under federal law, arbitration in Japan. Shinto
Shipping garnished the Bank of California in order to establish jurisdiction,
alleging that the bank held deposits made by Fibrex at the bank's branch in
Portland, Oregon. The Bank resisted the garnishment and refused to answer
the usual interrogatories.
Citing section 542.5 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, the federal
court refused to compel the garnishee to answer: "A California state court
would, I am confident, hold the attachment in question invalid as to remote
branch accounts."" This exemplifies, similar to Williamson, the lack of
property or debt "here" under state law, hence a rejection of Harris v. Balk
on state law grounds.
Such a holding makes sense, when one realizes that a general deposit
account at a bank is not a mere bailment of money. On the contrary, a
deposit into an account is a loan of money from the depositor to the bank;
it establishes a debtor-creditor relationship, with the bank as the debtor.'
83. Compare Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 341 F.2d 50 (2d
Cir. 1965) (applying New York law); Shinto Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Fibrex & Shipping Co., Inc.,
425 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Cal. 1976), affid, 572 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1978) (applying California
law); Ellis v. Barclays Bank PLC-Miami Agency, 594 So. 2d 827 (Fla. App. Ct. 1992) (all
holding that garnishment must be directed to the branch bank where the account is "maintained");
with Bank of Montreal v. Clark, 108 111. App. 163 (1908); Wilton Enter. v. Cook's Pantry, 552
A.2d 1031 (N.J. Super. L. 1988) (holding garnishment at any branch gives notice to the entire
corporate banking enterprise). Cases are collected at 12 A.L.R.3d 1081 (1965).
84. 425 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D.Cal. 1976), affd, 572 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1978).
85. Id. at 1091.
86. See, e.g., Lasley v. Bank of Northeast Arkansas, 627 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Ark. Ct.App.
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Hence, the account balance is in fact a debt running from the bank to the
depositor, intangible and susceptible to distorted definitions of its location.
Under this view, Shinto Shipping was correct in its sensible location of the
account in Oregon, where the deposit was made and the debt created, not in
California, where the Bank was located.
A different result would surely obtain in the case of an actual bailment,
via safe deposit, for instance, of money to the bank. The contents of a safe
deposit box are located in the jurisdiction wherein the box lies. Likewise, if
the deposit were to take on some tangible form of its own legal significance,
like a certificate of deposit, for instance, then it would make sense for the
actual location of the certificate to suffice under state property law.
State law alone will not always do, as shown by the present state of
Arkansas garnishment law. Wal-Mart, of course, has its principle place of
business in Bentonville, Arkansas, and is a very large employer and account
debtor. Hence Wal-Mart is very frequently an attractive garnishee in cases
involving defendants with little or no connection between themselves and
Arkansas. Furthermore, the Arkansas garnishment statute may not withstand
constitutional scrutiny under various holdings of the Arkansas Supreme
CourtY However, the Arkansas Supreme Court has also held that the
garnishee has no standing to raise this constitutional objection.' So, it is
quite easy to see the constitutional questions raised by a rejection of the
Williamson state-law theory by imagining a case involving a Florida
judgment against a Florida resident who works for Wal-Mart in Orlando.
Wages are exempt in Florida,' so a garnishment where the wages are
earned would not yield a favorable result. If the defendant's wages are
garnished in Arkansas, the defendant would suffer an extreme burden if
required to come to Arkansas and attack the use of the remote - to the
Florida resident - garnishment. Wal-Mart itself cannot object to the
1982). See generally 5A MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING § 1 (1994).
87. See generally Robert Laurence, Recent Developments in the Arkansas Law of
Garnishment: A Compendium of the Pertinent Cases and Statutes, 1992 ARK. L. NOTES 39, 47-
49. The Arkansas garnishment statute was first held unconstitutional in Davis v. Paschall, 640
F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Ark. 1986). Accord In re McDougal, 65 B.R. 495 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1986);
cf. Duhon v. Gravett, 790 S.W.2d 155 (Ark. 1990) (Arkansas's post-judgment execution statute
is unconstitutional). This defect was fixed by Act 523 of 1987. The statute as amended was again
declared unconstitutional in Bob Hankins Distrib. Co. v. May, 805 S.W.2d 625 (Ark. 1991). In
its attempt to fix the Hankins defect by Act 1027 of 1991, the General Assembly required that
notice go out to explain the law to the garnishee; unfortunately the statutorily required notice mis-
explains the law by using a prior, not current version of the statute. If this is a third
constitutional defect - and if lack of notice is a problem, then notice of the wrong law would
seem to be, if anything, worse - then Kennedy v. Kelly, 751 S.W.2d 6 (Ark. 1988), holds that
the defect cannot be fixed by the plaintiff itself correcting the notice.
88. Kennedy, 751 S.V.2d at 7.
89. FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. XV, § 222.11 (West 1989).
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garnishment, even if it had an interest in doing so.' Unless there is an
effective constitutional attack on the jurisdiction of the Arkansas
garnishment, traditional full faith and credit analysis requires that Florida
respect the Arkansas garnishment9
The best resolution to this quandary is a two-step analysis: First, under
Williamson, then under Shaffer. That is to say, the first question is whether,
under state garnishment law, the debt is "here." If it is, then the second
question is whether it comports with the International Shoe anti-surprise
rights of both the defendant and the garnishee for this state's garnishment
process to reach the debt.
Other cases discussing Shaffer issues after judgment, and Shaffer's
footnote 36, are less useful than those already discussed. Hexter v. Hexter,'
Rich v. Rich,"' Berger v. Berger,' Fraser v. Littlejohn" and Fine v.
Spierer' all involved attempts by creditors to reach legacies under wills in
favor of their judgment debtor; in the first three cases, the underlying
judgment was one for support and in the last two it was in contract. In Rich
and Littlejohn the legacies were described with enough specificity to suggest
little difficulty finding that the property was "here," i.e. in the state in which
enforcement was sought. For example, in Rich the legacy was securities,
apparently certificated, "now in the hands of New York attorneys. "" Rich,
then, resembles Quirk, and the attempt was to reach tangible personalty.
Attempts to reach such "Quirk property" where it is found are rarely, if ever,
surprising, in the International Shoe sense. On the other hand, it would be
equally rare that a post-judgment International Shoe hearing to show that the
shares were literally in New York would be especially cumbersome.
Hexter, Berger and Fine are somewhat more difficult cases, for the
tangibility, or not, of the legacies is not set forth. For example, Ms. Berger,
a resident of California sought to enforce in Vermont a California support
order against her ex-husband, a resident of Italy. Neither party had ever
lived in Vermont, and the only contact Mr. Berger had with Vermont was
that his mother had died there. The legacy was not described. The Vermont
Supreme Court stated: "Recognizing that, under the facts in Shaffer, the
90. Kennedy v. Kelly, 751 S.W.2d 6 (Ark. 1988).
91. 'There is authority to support the issuance of an injunction from the Florida state court
against the plaintiffs seeking the Arkansas garnishment. See in this regard LEMLAR, supra note
12, at 160 ("One of the most common types of cases in which injunctions are granted against
maintenance of foreign suits is that in which an extra-state garnishment is brought to reach a
claim that under the local law is exempt from garnishment.").
92. 386 N.E.2d 1C06 (End. App. 1979).
93. 402 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y. App. 1978).
94. 417 A.2d 921 (Vt. 1980).
95. 386 S.E.2d 230 (N.C. App. 1989).
96. 486 N.Y.S.2d 9 (N.Y. App. 1985).
97. Rich, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 769.
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footnote in question [36] is dicta, we are nonetheless inclined to follow it.
There is nothing in the concept of justice and fair play that requires a second
opportunity to litigate the liability established by a valid judgment."s True
enough, there seems at first blush nothing objectionable about garnishing an
estate in the state where it is being probated, even given that in other
circumstances having one's mother a resident of the state attempting to
exercise jurisdiction would not function as "minimum contact" for
International Shoe purposes. Suppose, however, that if all of the late Ms.
Berger's property was intangible and was "in Vermont" only because she was
there when she died and only because Vermont law said that the property
was "in Vermont." In that case Mr. Berger deserves a due process hearing
in which to argue that the garnishment would go on more fairly in the state
where the assets truly were located.
Holt v. Holt' involved an attempt by a resident of Missouri to enforce
a Missouri court order against her ex-husband, a resident of Alabama, against
real property located in North Carolina. Of course, there can be no surprise,
and hence no International Shoe objection to the enforcement of any
judgment against nonexempt real property in the state where one finds it, and
the North Carolina court agreed, citing Shaffer. The court refused to enforce
the order, but only on the grounds that the petitioner had, as yet, no final
judgment from Missouri:
We do not believe this dictum of the Supreme Court [in
footnote 36] embraces the facts disclosed by the record before
us. To proceed under this principle, we think it would be
essential for plaintiff to first obtain a judgment in the Missouri
courts that defendant is in arrears of a sum certain on the ordered
payments."
This is an entirely unobjectionable holding.
The reception given footnote 36 by the law review commentators has been
largely positive. Professor Richard B. Cappalli wrote in support of Shaffer's
footnote 36, and the lack of a due process inquiry after judgment:
We now understand why the Shaffer court could confidently say
that there would be no unfairness in a plaintiffs execution of a
judgment against a defendant's dispersed property [citing footnote
36]. The executing court should not do a full contacts probe
because that body is exercising such limited power against the
judgment debtor. That court is not assessing liability and
measuring compensation but merely making property available
98. Berger, 417 A.2d at 922.
99. 255 S.E.2d 407 (N.C. App. 1979).
100. Id. at 409.
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to satisfy the liquidated claim. Instead the assessing and
measuring is done by a judgment-issuing court with "full" in
personam power.'
As the previous discussion shows, the question is not so easy if the
property is intangible. When an Arkansas court declares that Arkansas is the
situs of wages which were earned in Florida working for Wal-Mart, and
allows the garnishment of Wal-Mart, under Arkansas law, to reach those
wages, notwithstanding Florida's strong public policy prohibiting the
garnishment of wages, it seems wrong to characterize Arkansas as "merely
making property available" to the plaintiff."
To make the point another way and to test the true limits of the dicta of
footnote 36, recall the Delaware law at issue in Shaffer, which made
Delaware the locus of all stock for all Delaware corporations. 3 Suppose
that Michigan law had a statutory provision analogous to Delaware's
proclaiming Michigan to be the situs of every automobile made anywhere by
an automaker whose principal place of business was Michigan. Thus, under
Michigan law, replevin actions could commence and go to judgment in
Michigan, then enforcement could go forward under full faith and credit
principles in the state where the car was in fact being driven. Should the
Constitution control such aggressive, if unlikely, use of state power? The
essence of Shaffer would seem to say that it should; dicta in the margin
should riot override this essence.
Professor David H. Vernon of the University of Iowa also wrote briefly
in support of footnote 36, shortly after the Shaffer decision came down."
He concluded that
[t] he exemption of proceedings to realize on judgments from the
minimum contacts standard of International Shoe is
pragmatically necessary if judgment debtors are to be prevented
from shielding their assets from judgment creditors by shipping
101. Richard B. Cappalli, Locke as the Key: A Unifying and Coherent Theory of In
Personam Jurisdiction, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 97, 115 (1992).
102. Scholarly acceptance, if not defense, of footnote 36 is found in Stanley Cox, Would
That Burnhara Had Not Come to be Done Insane! A Critique of Recent Supreme Court Personal
Jurisdiction Reasoning, An Explanation of Why Transient Presence Jurisdiction is
UnconstitutionaL and Some Thoughts About Divorce Jurisdiction in a Minimum Contacts World,
58 TENN. L. REv. 497, 511 (1991), and Note, Resisting Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
Under Article V(1)(e) and Article VI of the New York Convention: A Proposal for Effective
Guidelines, 68 TEx. L. REv. 1031, 1035, n.21 (1990).
103. See 8 DEL. CODE § 169 (1991).
104. David H. Vernon, State-Court Jurisdiction: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Impact of
Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IowA L. REv. 997, 1007-08 (1978).
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the assets to a state with which the underlying litigatiod had no
prior connection. 5
The key word in that quotation is "shipping," for it implies the most tangible
kind of personal property: the kind capable of shipment across state lines.
This, of course, is "Quirk property," tangible and easily locatable, the very
kind of property that is not usually at issue, even in Shaffer itself. Reversing
footnote 36 to require a due process inquiry on the enforcement would,
indeed, make enforcement a bit more cumbersome. But, as shown by Quirk,
this would hardly be so in the case of goods "shipped" across state lines. On
the other hand, to allow the garnishment in one state of wages earned in
another, or of accounts receivable created in another, without a hearing on
due process concerns seems hardly "pragmatically necessary," and regulating
these far-reaching garnishments under the Constitution and International
Shoe will control abuse by forum-shopping creditors against understandably
complacent debtors.
Messrs. Pickholz and Bernard, as well, approved of footnote 36, in their
article about foreign - that is, international - attachment." Discussing
the case of Biel v. Boehm,'°7 they reason that
a plaintiff with a foreign country judgment must obtain
jurisdiction over the defendant to enforce the foreign country
judgment in New York. The plaintiff, however, need only
establish pre-Shaffer quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. That is, the
plaintiff does not need to establish a relationship between the
assets, the forum and the litigation - mere presence of assets is
sufficient to support jurisdiction. This is to be distinguished from
post-Shaffer quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, which requires minimum
contacts, and is necessary to support an order of attachment
before judgment is obtained.'"
"Mere presence of assets."'" Biel is a case in which the property against
which the enforcement action is undertaken is not described more than to say
that it is "located in New York.""' Again, if the property is real or tangible
personal property, then there is no objection to New York's exercise of
jurisdiction over the enforcement action. If the property sought is intangible,
susceptible to having many locations, then it might be "located in New
York" in much the same way that the defendants' property in Shaffer was
105. Id. at 1008.
106. Marvin G. Pickholz & James Bernard, Civil Disclosure and Freezing Orders:
Recovering Property from Overseas, 13 DICK. J. INT'L L. 479 (1995).
107. 406 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1978).
108. Pickholz & Bernard, supra note 106, at 507.
109. lit
110. Biel, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 233.
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"located in Delaware," i.e. by legislative fiat. Then there are due process
concerns in the enforcement action, footnote 36 to the contrary
notwithstanding. Are the earned but unpaid wages of a Tennessee resident,
working in Tennessee for a Connecticut-based employer "present" in
Connecticut for the purposes of that conclusion? The question should have
a constitutional dimension.
Finally, there is the work of Professor Maltz, which, read narrowly,
appears to affirm the cogency of Shaffer's footnote 36:
One of the difficulties with Marshall's analysis is that on its
face it threatens a mainstay of American jurisprudence - the
concept that one can always enforce a judgment obtained against
a defendant in one state by levying against property located in
another state. An action to enforce a judgment is a classic quasi
in rem situation; the judgment creditor is seeking to seize
property in order to vindicate a claim based on the defendant's
breach of a duty which may be completely unrelated to the
property. The body of the Shaffer opinion suggests that in such
a case the judgment could be enforced only if the judgment
debtor has minimum contacts with the state where the property
is located. Such a rule would represent a radical change from
current practice. Marshall brushed off this problem rather
cavalierly in a footnote [quoting footnote 36]. 1'
As it is clear from this quotation, Professor Maltz does not think much of
Shaffer at all, and helps to establish his critique by pointing out that footnote
36 is not much of an explanation of why the principles of Shaffer do not
apply after judgment. My position is exactly the opposite one: the principles
of Shaffer should apply after judgment as well as before.
Pickholz and Bernard cite Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States to this effect: "[A]n action to enforce a judgment
may usually be brought whenever property of the defendant is found, without
any necessary connection between the underlying action and the property, or
between the defendant and the forum."". This comment is certainly correct
in noting that there is nothing, either in state or constitutional law, that
requires a connection between the property against which execution is sought
and the cause of action that led to the money judgment. This observation is
not in dispute. The comment may well, in fact, be correct in its entirety,
depending on the construction one gives to the word "usually." Quirk and
other cases of that tangible ilk are the "usual" cases, and in those cases a
I11. Elrl M. Maltz, Reflections on a Landmark: Shaffer v. Heitner Viewed from a Distance,
1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1043, 1046.
112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 481 cmt. h (1987), cited in Pickholz & Bernard, supra note 106, at 507 n.181.
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link does not need to exist between the property sought for enforcement and
the underlying cause of action. Garnishments of wages, bank accounts,
accounts receivable and other intangible debts may comprise the "unusual"
cases. Problems arise when the plaintiff is being especially creative in
finding the state of the property's "presence," and even more so when it is
an on-reservation debt that is being sought off-reservation.
All the parameters of postjudgment due process analysis - including
precisely where the garnishment of an intangible asset must occur - are yet
to be worked out and, given Shaffer's footnote 36, it may be a while before
they are. In Delaware, at least, where Shaffer arose, it appears the courts
took footnote 36 to heart, and apply it directly to allow judgment creditors
to reach the stock of Delaware corporations, which Delaware law has
declared is located in Delaware."' Some other states, as seen previously,
have been more circumspect.
The synthesis is this: The first question is Williamson's and Shinto
Shipping's: under state law, is there any property "here"? Sometimes the
answer will be easy, as in Quirk and Holt, and as Professors Vernon and
Cappalli and Messers. Pickholz and Bernard presume. However, when the
property becomes intangible and susceptible to a variety of simultaneous
locations, the question becomes more difficult, as shown by the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations' use of the word "usually.""' 4 A state court
could surely reject Harris v. Balk on pure policy grounds, holding that wages
earned elsewhere are not "here," even when some corporate aspect of the
employer is here. Kingland Holdings and UMS Partners are to the contrary
under Delaware's famously aggressive corporate law. Rich and Littlejohn are
quietly consistent with Williamson; Hexter, Berger and Fine are not. Where
states follow Delaware's lead and keep an aggressive Harris v. Balk rule as
a matter of state property law, the Constitution should come into play. This
result, which is contrary to footnote 36's dicta and Professor Maltz's
arguments, is shown by Crockett Motor Sales and, reading between the lines ,
Control Data. Goodyear and Concepts "100" are correct in providing some
due process protection for the garnishee, but incorrect in providing none for
the defendant.
Goodyear and Concepts "100" suggest the continued validity of Harris v.
Balk after judgment. Even though Shaffer's footnote 36 is consistent with
this position, that result is unfortunate as a general, sweeping proposition.
A narrower reading of the two cases is more acceptable, emphasizing that,
in Goodyear the original divorce action had been brought in Maryland and,
113. See Kingland Holdings Inc. v. Bracco, No. Civ.A.96-14817, 1996 WL 104257 (Del.
Chane. 1996); UMS Partners, Ltd. v. Jackson, No. 95E-01-043, 1995 WL 413395 (Del. Super.
1995).
114. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 481 cmt. h (1987), cited in Pickholz & Bernard, supra note 106, at 507 n.181.
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in Concepts "100" the original products liability action had been brought in
Pennsylvania. If the cases are correct when read this narrowly, then they
would seem to be directly on point for the hypothetical case in the present
article, where the original contract action was brought in New Mexico state
courts and the plaintiff, Mesa City Dodge, is attempting to reach some of the
garnishees in that same jurisdiction. It is here, however, in the Indian
reservation context, that accepted principles of American Indian law
constrain off-reservation garnishments, even if Shaffer permits them more
generally.
Off-reservation Garnishment in State Court: McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Commission Issues
The key case that modifies the Goodyear result when it is an Indian
reservation boundary being crossed is not a garnishment case at all, but
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission.' In that landmark case,
the Court held that it was beyond the power of Arizona to tax McClanahan's
reservation income. The Court showed no concern at all for where else
beside the Navajo reservation that McClanahan's employer might do business
or whether Arizona's jurisdiction otherwise ran to the employer, who was not
named. There was no indication that the State of. Arizona could tax
McClanahan's income merely by finding her employer off-reservation, and
thus it would be wholly inconsistent with McClanahan for a court to permit
a private plaintive to garnish McClanahan's income using Arizona process by
finding the employer off-reservation.
The key to the McClanahan case was that McClanahan's income was
earned on the reservation, not for whom it was earned and where the
employer did business. This should function as the rule for garnishment as
well. Income earned on the reservation should be garnished using the tribal
judicial system; income earned off-reservation should be garnished using the
state judicial system, likewise for accounts receivable and bank accounts.
This view of McClanahan's holding is, in fact, broadly consistent with
Shaffer's treatment of Harris v. Balk. In Harris, the Court found it especially
significant that Harris, the garnishee, was susceptible to suit by Balk,
Epstein's defendant, in Maryland."' In the reservation garnishment
115. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
116. The Supreme Court wrote:
If there be a law of the State providing for the attachment of the debt, then if the
garnishee be found in that State, and process be personally served upon him
therein, we think the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over him, and can garnish
the debt due from him to the debtor of the plaintiff and condemn it, provided the
garnishee could himself be sued by his creditor in that state....
There can be no doubt that Balk, as a citizen of the State of North Carolina,
had the right to sue Harris in Maryland to recover the debt which Harris owed
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situation, the parallel inquiry would concern Avila's ability to sue, say,
Global Mining in state court over the employment contract. Such a suit
would be problematic in New Mexico, of course, because Global Mining has
so few contacts with that state. Could she sue her employer in Colorado, its
principal place of business, over her reservation employment contract?
In fact, the Wold Engineering cases"' suggest that Avila does indeed
have that right, notwithstanding that Williams v. Lee holds that Global
Mining could not sue her in state court on the same contract."' If Harris
were still good law, then Wold Engineering would suggest that Avila's right
to sue Global Mining in Colorado state court would lead to Mesa City
Dodge's right to garnish Global Mining there to reach Avila's wages. But
Shaffer overruled Harris, at least "to [the] extent that [these] prior decisions
are inconsistent with [International Shoe's] standard [of 'fair play and
substantial justice']"" and that result is repudiated.'" Without Harris, the
link between Wold Engineering and the Colorado garnishment is missing,
and the garnishment cannot go on. Shaffer and McClanahan each separately,
as well as together, compel a holding denying that Mesa City Dodge's right
to garnish Global Mining in an off-reservation court to reach Avila's on-
reservation wages and the garnishment should occur in tribal court under
tribal process. If there is no tribal garnishment process, or if wages are
exempt under Tewa law, then Mesa City Dodge must seek other, nonexempt,
off-reservation property.
The other two common types of garnishments should be handled the same
way: the garnishing of bank accounts should only take place where the
deposit waF made and accounts receivable where the contract underlying the
account was made and performed. If these connections with the relevant
jurisdictions are mixed, then the jurisdiction whose interest predominates
should control. As the law regarding the state taxation of reservation assets
is so much more completely developed than the law of private debt
him. Being a citizen of North Carolina, he was entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the several States, one of which is the right to institute
actions in the courts of another State.
Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 221, 223 (1905) (emphasis added).
117. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 476 U.S.
877 (1986); Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 467
U.S. 138 (1984).
118. The apparent tension between Williams v. Lee and Wold Engineering - especially in
the case where Avila sues Global Mining in state court under Wold and Global Mining
counterclaims contrary to Williams - has never been fully examined by the Court, and need not
be here.
119. Shaffer v. Hietner, 433 U.S. 196, 212 n.39 (1977).
120. On the question of whether Shaffer technically overruled Harris v. Balk, see sources
cited supra note 73.
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enforcement,"2 ' the courts should follow the Supreme Court's lead in the
taxation cases, such as McClanahan.
In the case of Begay v. Roberts,'" the Arizona Court of Appeals used
at least half of the analysis urged here. Specht, owner of Sandland Motors
of Page, Arizona, recovered judgment against Begay, who did not pay
voluntarily. Specht then sought to reach Begay's wages by garnishing his
employer, the Salt River Project, under Arizona process. One writ was
served on Salt River's office on-reservation and one at its office off-
reservation. (Salt River is a state agency reachable in many places across
Arizona.) Begay received notice of the garnishments and moved to quash
them. That motion denied, Begay sought "special action," or mandamus,
against Roberts, the justice of the peace who issued the writs. Relief was
denied and Begay appealed."
The court of appeals reversed and granted the relief,"M the result just
urged. The first half of the opinion, though, was unsatisfying, for the court
rejected, in very short order, Begay's argument that the garnishments were
invalid as a matter of non-Indian law. That is to say, the court rejected the
theory that Shaffer v. Heitner places limits on the ability to garnish an
employer merely by finding it in the jurisdiction: "Under Arizona law, the
justice court clearly had jurisdiction to issue the writs of garnishment against
[Salt River] .... [A]s a general rule, wages can be garnished in the forum
where the employee could sue for them.""
A pre-Shaffer, 1924 Arizona Supreme Court case was cited." Of
course, this quotation harkens directly to the now discredited Harris v. Balk
and needs reinspection under Shaffer."
121. In addition to McClanahan, other tax cases include Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizens
Band of the Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. N.M., 490
U.S. 163 (1989); California State Bd. of Equalization v. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, 474 U.S. 9
(1985); Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of N.M., 458 U.S. 832 (1982);
Central Mach. Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980); White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenal Tribes of the Flathead
Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973);
Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commu'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
Williams v. Lee and the Wold Engineering cases were contract disputes. In addition to these
two non-tax cases, see California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987)
(gaming); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983) (liquor sales); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache
Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983) (hunting).
122. 807 P.2d 1111 (Ariz. App. 1990).
123. Id. at 1112-13.
124. Id. at 1118. The court of appeals affirmed the part of the lower court's decision finding
that subject matter and personal jurisdiction existed in the "justice court," and hence Specht's
underlying judgments were proper.
125. Id. at 1114.
126. Weitzel v. Weitzel, 230 P.2d 1106 (Ariz. 1924).
127. The Weitzel court's citation to Harris v. Balk is found at Weitzel, 230 P.2d at 1107.
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Huggins v. Deinhard,'" also cited by the Begay court,'" was a non-
Indian case in which the Arizona Court of Appeals did that reinspection and
followed the dicta of Shaffers footnote 36. The facts were these: Deinhard
was divorced by his wife, now Huggins, in California, and ordered to pay
support. He fell into arrears, causing the past-due installments to become
final money judgments.' Huggins then garnished Deinhard's Arizona bank
under Arizona garnishment process. The court concluded: "[T]here is no
unfairness in allowing [Huggins] to realize on [the California judgment] debt
in Arizona where Deinhard has property, whether or not the Arizona court
would have jurisdiction to determine the existence of the debt as an original
matter.'W
3
'
In Begay, the court of appeals was faced with a prior holding contrary to
the position taken above that there is and should be an International Shoe
due process inquiry, even after judgment, notwithstanding footnote 36 of
Shaffer. Begay followed Huggins and, to that extent, the decision was
unfortunate. A court might well conclude as a general matter that Arizona
bank accounts were garnishable pursuant to California judgments, but an
opportunity should exist to argue against that result, both on state and
constitutional grounds.
First, recall Shinto Shipping's holding that a debt created by an Oregon
deposit was located in Oregon, and not in California, even if the plaintiff
could find some corporate aspect of the bank in California.3 This sensible
result required at a minimum an inquiry into where the deposit was made.
Beyond that state law inquiry, lies the constitutional one: Suppose the
money had been deposited in a California bank which was related, through
some obscure corporate structure unknown to the depositor, to the Arizona
bank. Suppose the balance in the account was protected from garnishment
under the law of California but not Arizona, and that the plaintiff was
seeking a friendly forum in which to garnish. Is such a garnishment fair and
substantially just? The defendant, who is the true party in interest, is entitled
to a hearing to determine that.
The court of appeals in Begay did agree with the suggested analysis
regarding the legitimacy of garnishing off-reservation to reach wages earned
on-reservation. Using well-known Indian law principles, the court said:
[T]he garnishment of a reservation Indian's wages earned on
the reservation is preempted and infringes on Navajo tribal
sovereignty. Even though the garnishment in this case may take
place physically off the reservation . . . the effect of the
128. 654 P.2d 32 (Ariz. App. 1982).
129. Begay, 807 P.2d at 1114.
130. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4700(a), quoted in Huggins, 654 P.2d at 36.
131. Huggins, 654 P.2d at 37 (citing Shaffer, 422 U.S. 186 (1977)).
132. See supra text accompanying note 84.
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garnishment will be felt by Begay on the reservation. In this
regard, the Navajo Tribe has enacted laws concerning the
enforcement of judgments, which do not include garnishing
wages. To allow a state court to garnish a tribal member's wages
earned on the reservation would thwart the Navajo Tribe's
authority to not allow garnishments of this sort.'
This is a strong, convincing and correct analysis.
In the end, then, Begay reached the correct result with respect to off-
reservation garnishments of on-reservation wages. Compare First v. State ex
rel. Laroche,"M from the Supreme Court of Montana, which asked this
question: If wages earned on-reservation should be garnished on-reservation,
and wages earned off-reservation should be garnished off-reservation, then
where should unemployment benefits be garnished?
In the first place, unemployment benefits are generally exempt from
garnishment.'35 Federal law, however, requires that support creditors be
permitted to garnish at least some of the benefit," and the First case
involved LaRoche's attempt to reach her ex-husband's Montana
unemployment benefits to enforce her South Dakota support order.
The First court addressed the same issues as Begay did, except in the
opposite order, reaching a different conclusion. Applying Indian law
principles first, the Court held that the federal law, cited above," 7 requiring
Montana to remove its exemption from unemployment benefits to make them
reachable by support claimants resulted in federal preemption of the field and
permitted the garnishment to go on under state law. This, of course, was the
reverse of the usual preemption doctrine, which ordinarily prevents the
application of state law,' and one Justice dissented on these grounds.'
Preemption analysis is not necessary to resolve this issue. Unemployment
benefits are state and federally administrated funds, enacted by off-
reservation legislatures, the money coming via off-reservation treasuries, and
paid off-reservation, even if there is an unemployment office on the
reservation."4 True, either state or federal law, responding to on-reservation
unemployment and poverty might provide special exempt status for benefits
paid to Indians, but, not having done so, the off-reservation garnishment of
133. Begay, 807 P.2d at 1116 (emphasis added).
134. 803 P.2d 467 (Mont. 1991).
135. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-51-3106 (1987); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-10-109
(1987).
136. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 654, 662 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-51-3106 (1987).
137. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 654 (1994).
138. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
139. First, 808 P.2d at 473 (Trieweiler, J. dissenting).
140. A very useful chart showing the interaction of state and federal treasuries and how
employer unemployment compensation taxes intermingle is found in WEX S. MALONE ET AL.,
WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS 498 (2d ed. 1980).
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an off-reservation entitlement would seem appropriate, even under Indian law
principles.
What of non-Indian-law, Shaffer v. Heitner, concerns? Citing footnote 36
and several of the cases discussed above, the First Court wrote:
Here, because this action is to enforce an already determined
debt, an outstanding child support obligation, Mr. First, Jr.'s
"minimum contacts" are not at issue. However, even if Mr. First,
Jr.'s "minimum contacts" were at issue, Mr. First, Jr. clearly
established "minimum contacts" with the State of Montana by
accepting Montana unemployment insurance benefits, benefits
governed under [Montana law].' 4
The second sentence was correct, but as should by now be clear, the first
was not.
Professor Margery Brown of the University of Montana and Brenda
Desmond, a supervising attorney in Montana's Indian Law Clinic carefully
analyzed First as part of their lengthy article on Montana's tribal courts,'
arguing that the garnishment should have been before the tribal court: "[In
First, where all parties were Indians, the state's interest was minimal. First
involved only Indian parties and a reservation-based claim in an area long
seen principally the interests of tribal self-government."' 3 However, I am
more generous to the Montana Supreme Court, and think that that the type
of property being sought, state and federally funded and administered
unemployment compensation, was relevant. As Brown and Desmond point
out, the judgment being enforced was a domestic one between Indian parties
and within what was once an Indian family. Such a judgment was perhaps
properly within the tribe's jurisdiction, even after the wife moves off-
reservation and out-of-state. A due process attack on South Dakota's
jurisdiction over the underlying divorce case was acceptable under full faith
and credit principles and was proper collaterally when enforcement was
sought in Montana or before the tribal courts. But if there was a valid
judgment from South Dakota, enforceable on or off reservation, then it seems
the place to garnish the nonexempt unemployment benefits was in South
Dakota state court."*
141. First, 808 P.2d at 473.
142. Margery H. Brown & Brenda C. Desmond, Montana Tribal Courts: Influencing the
Development of Contemporary Indian Law, 52 MONT. L. REV. 211, 277-87 (1991).
143. Id. at 285.
144. Professor Brown's and Ms. Desmond's discussion of First is in the context of their
careful inspection of Indian law as it applies to Montana tribal courts, and they have serious and
important criticisms of the way First fits into the general evolution of Indian law jurisprudence
as established by the Montana Supreme Court. I have no dispute with their broader conclusions
about such issues as whether the First court did, and should have, followed earlier decisions of
the Montana Supreme Court.
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Conclusion
Returning to this article's original hypothetical, then, we have the
following result. New Mexico garnishment process can be used to reach the
money in Roberta Avila's off-reservation account at the First Federal Savings
Bank, because she deposited the money and created the debt off-reservation.
New Mexico and federal wage exemption laws will apply, probably to little
avail, as the money is no longer in the form of wages."5 However, Avila
should be able to change this result by beginning to make deposits at the on-
reservation ATM machine, or by using some sort of direct electronic deposit,
at which point tribal garnishment process would have to be used, and tribal
and federal exemptions would apply. The tribe, in turn, might determine to
protect wages all the way into her bank account."
The pots that are located at Garcia's Pawn Shop are reachable via a New
Mexico writ of garnishment, as is any indebtedness that Garcia owes Avila
for pots sold. The only way to keep the pots themselves from beyond the
reach of a New Mexico writ of garnishment is to keep them on the
reservation. Avila can avoid New Mexico jurisdiction over the accounts
receivable only by insisting that Garcia contract with her and take delivery
of the pots on-reservation, which may be to her considerable commercial
detriment.
Could Avila and Garcia, by artful drafting of their consignment contract,
locate the place of the contract in some state where her creditors could not
garnish her? A court could easily avoid any such hiding of a transaction by
using a rule analogous to the Uniform Commercial Code's choice of law
rule, insisting that the parties could not locate the place of contracting in any
state that does not have a "reasonable" or "appropriate" relationship to the
contract.' 47
-The pots placed with the on-reservation Tewa Potters' Cooperative, and
accounts receivable relating to pots sold by the Cooperative can only be
reached through Tewa process.
Finally, Avila's wages earned working on-reservation for Global Mining
are reachable only by a Tewa writ of garnishment served properly on Global
Mining, according to Tewa rules, and subject to Tewa and federal
exemptions. Global Mining might be susceptible to process in New Mexico,
but this is problematic, as it does little business there. If New Mexico
145. See Usery v. First National Bank of Ariz., 586 F.2d 107 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that
the federal protections against wage garnishments under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677 (1994) do not
last all the way into the bank account).
146. There is nothing inherently suspicious about such a protective exemption. In fact, the
federal social security exemption extends beyond payment and into the bank account of the
recipient. See 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1994).
147. See UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-105(1) (1977).
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service can be made, then under Williamson, the New Mexico court should
first address the question of whether the debt for Avila's wages is located in
New Mexico, the better answer being "no." If the New Mexico court were
to decide that the debt is located there, then under Goodyear, the
garnishment could go on in New Mexico, as it was the site of the underlying
lawsuit. States other than New Mexico, and foreign countries where Global
Mining can be found should decline to exercise jurisdiction over Avila's
wages, both under Williamson and under Shaffer.
If Avila occasionally has to leave the reservation in the course of her
employment, the garnishment should still go on under Tewa rules, assuming
that the off-reservation work is entirely incidental to her employment. If
Avila regularly works off-reservation, then Global Mining should be
susceptible to off-reservation garnishment to reach those off-reservation
wages.
As mundane as enforcement of judgment issues appear to be, they raise
important matters of both tribal and state sovereignty. These sovereign
interests do not disappear when an off-reservation garnishment is undertaken;
they have only been preempted by the garnishment. Such a preemption
subordinates many of the sovereign interests of both the state and the tribe
to that of a private plaintiff seeking payment. Such a single-minded plaintiff
can not be expected to make the arguments necessary for the protection of
the sovereign interests involved. This, of course, is always true when
judgments are enforced across jurisdictional boundaries. Special care must
be taken when the boundary is an Indian reservation boundary; tribal
sovereignty is more fragile than most, due to years of direct and indirect,
good faith and bad, attempts to destroy it.
One way to protect that sovereignty is to insist upon a careful cross-
boundary recognition and enforcement rules, which ought not be a fully
reciprocal full faith and credit regime. A second way to protect sovereignty
is to keep enforcement officers confined to their own geographical limits,
and not to use state execution and garnishment directly on the reservation.
The third way is to take care that each sovereign retain judicial control over
assets within its domain. With respect to real property and tangible personal
property, the actual location of the assets governs which jurisdiction controls,
and is rarely an issue. With respect to intangible assets, susceptible to many
legislatively defined "locations," the actual location of those assets must be
inquired into, and that actual location is where they are created, not merely
where the law of one jurisdiction or the other artificially says they are
located, nor, under Harris v. Balk, where the plaintiff fortuitously finds the
garnishee. Due process and Shaffer, federal Indian law and McClanahan, and
sensible common law all require the same result: It should become the law
of each state where the assets of the defendant are reachable under the
process of only the state or tribe, as appropriate, depending on the actual
location of both tangible and intangible assets.
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